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Diagnostic errors have been attributed to failure to sufficiently reflect on initial diagnoses. 
However, evidence of the benefits of reflection is conflicting. This study examined whether 
reflection upon initial diagnoses on difficult cases improved diagnostic accuracy and whether 
reflection triggered by confrontation with case evidence was more beneficial than simply 
revising initial diagnoses. 
Method 
Participants were physicians in Bern, Switzerland, registered for the 2018 Swiss internal 
medicine certification exam. They diagnosed written clinical cases, providing an initial 
diagnosis by following the same instructions and returning to the case to provide a final 
diagnosis. The latter required different types of reflection depending on the physician’s 
experimental condition: return without instructions; identify confirmatory evidence; identify 
contradictory evidence; or identify both confirmatory and contradictory evidence. The 
authors examined diagnostic accuracy scores (range 0–1) as a function of diagnostic phase 
and reflection type. 
Results 
One hundred and sixty-seven physicians participated. Diagnostic accuracy scores did not 
significantly differ between the 4 groups of physicians in the initial (I) or the final (F) 
diagnostic phase mean (95% CI): return without instructions, I: 0.21 (0.17, 0.26), F: 0.23 
(0.18, 0.28); confirmatory evidence, I: 0.24 (0.19, 0.29), F: 0.31 (0.25, 0.37); contradictory 
evidence, I: 0.22 (0.17, 0.26), F: 0.26 (0.22, 0.30); confirmatory and contradictory evidence, 
I: 0.19 (0.15, 0.23), F: 0.25 (0.20, 0.31). Regardless of type of reflection employed while 
revising the case, accuracy increased significantly between initial and final diagnosis: I, 0.22 









Physicians’ diagnostic accuracy improved after reflecting upon initial diagnoses provided for 
difficult cases, independently of the evidence searched for while reflecting. The findings 
support the importance attributed to reflection in clinical teaching. Future research should 
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Diagnostic error has attracted the attention of the public and researchers since the 1999 
Institute of Medicine report To Err is Human demonstrated the large societal cost of medical 
errors.1 A recent follow-up report points to diagnostic error as one of the most common and 
most harmful patient safety problems.2 Based on research showing diagnostic errors to affect 
around 12 million adults each year in U.S. outpatient settings alone, the report estimates that 
most people are likely to experience at least 1 diagnostic error in their lifetime. Many of these 
errors have minor consequences, but patients can also be severely harmed,3–6 and diagnostic 
error remains the most common and most costly reason internationally for malpractice claims 
in every large health system.7  
Retrospective studies of malpractice claims8 and patients files9,10 have suggested that 
physicians’ cognitive processes are implicated in most cases of diagnostic errors. What can 
go wrong in physicians’ reasoning and how mistakes can be minimized have been a subject 
of much debate.11–13 Research on clinical reasoning over the last decades has shown that 
physicians tend to generate diagnostic hypotheses early in a clinical encounter, subsequently 
verifying them by gathering additional information.14,15 While hypotheses are generated 
through an intuitive, largely unconscious process of pattern-recognition, their verification 
takes place under conscious control. The diagnostic process tends to involve, therefore, both 
intuitive and reflective reasoning modes, but the extent to which clinicians adopt one or the 
other mode while diagnosing a particular case seems to vary substantially depending on 
several factors.16,17 
Diagnostic errors have been frequently associated with failure to engage in reflection with a 
consequent excessive reliance on first impressions.11,13,18,19 Several authors have argued that 
returning to the case to verify the grounds of initial diagnosis would repair eventual errors 
made by rapid, intuitive judgments, thereby reducing diagnostic mistakes. Such errors can 
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actually irrelevant (or not so relevant), and a wrong initial diagnosis is generated. Repairing 
this wrong diagnosis is not always easy, because we all have a natural tendency to look for 
(and value) evidence that supports rather than refutes our impressions.20,21 Only when 
physicians engage in critically scrutinizing the case evidence can they counteract this 
tendency, opening the door for recognition of actually relevant findings to occur, which 
eventually brings the right diagnosis to mind.  
This explanation for diagnostic error and the role of reflection builds upon research in 
psychology of reasoning.22,23 There is also some empirical evidence that the findings from 
this research it in fact apply to medical diagnosis. An approach to foster deliberate reflection 
upon initial diagnosis increased diagnostic accuracy in several studies.24–27 Deliberate 
reflection corrected initial mistakes, at least when cases were not straightforward,24,25 and 
also counteracted the adverse effect of cognitive bias induced, for example, by recent 
experiences with a similar-looking (but in fact different) disease.26,27 The approach employed 
in these experiments requires physicians to return to the case to search for evidence that 
speaks in favor of and against their initial diagnosis, then consider which other diagnoses 
would be plausible and submit each diagnosis to similar analysis before making a final 
decision. Studies using checklists to guide reflection upon the problem during verification of 
initial diagnostic hypothesis have also found substantial increase in accuracy after 
reflection.28,29 However, other studies found reflection to have no added value. An 
experiment that requested physicians to diagnose clinical cases by following instructions 
either to be as quick as possible or to be careful and reflective found no differences in 
diagnostic accuracy.30 The negative relationship between accuracy and time to diagnosis 
observed in a study with medical residents was interpreted as a sign that there would be no 
advantage of spending more time to reflect further on the case.31 A study by Ilgen and 
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and giving the first seemingly plausible diagnosis or by first summarizing the case 
information, then listing alternative diagnoses and, only after that, deciding which one was 
the most likely in light of the case features. The more reflective approach did not lead to 
higher diagnostic accuracy relative to the first diagnostic impression.  
It therefore remains unclear whether physicians and their patients would actually benefit from 
further reflection upon initial diagnoses to increase diagnostic accuracy, and, consequently, 
whether medical teachers should teach the value of reflection. Case difficulty and 
participants’ expertise apparently influence what can be gained from reflection,24,25 but none 
of these factors differed substantially in the studies that arrived at discrepant findings. They 
cannot therefore explain the discrepancies, and other factors might play a role. Specifically, 
the different methodological approaches that the studies have employed suggest that what 
results from further reflection depends on what reflection entails, that is, on the type of 
reflection. The deliberate reflection approach that has been shown to improve initial 
diagnosis24–27 confronted physicians with confirmatory and contradictory evidence from the 
case. Because this confrontation directs attention to findings that may have remained initially 
unnoticed, it fosters retrieval of appropriate knowledge and reorganization of diagnostically 
relevant information. This restructuring of initial reasoning may be required for reflection to 
help, and it is likely to take place particularly when the evidence that physicians are requested 
to search for speaks against the initial diagnosis. This claim seems reasonable, and is 
supported by psychological research,33,34 but to our knowledge has not been empirically 
investigated. Indeed, it is not clear whether a minimal search for any type of evidence would 
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This study aimed to examine, first, whether reflection upon an initial diagnosis improved 
diagnostic accuracy and, second, whether reflection triggered by confrontation with different 
types of case evidence was more beneficial than simply revising the initial diagnosis. 
Physicians diagnosed clinical cases, first providing an initial diagnosis and then returning to 
the case to reflect further before making a final diagnosis. The final diagnosis was preceded 
by 1 of 4 “types” of reflection that differed in the extent to which physicians were confronted 
with evidence from the case. We expected reflection to improve diagnostic accuracy relative 
to initial diagnosis, with the improvement possibly increasing with the amount of reflection 
involved. As a secondary research question, we examined whether accuracy of the first 
diagnosis was associated with time spent on diagnosis. 
Method 
Overview 
The study was a randomized experiment with a mixed design in which all participants 
diagnosed a set of clinical cases one by one, first providing a diagnosis and then returning to 
the case to give a final diagnosis. All participants followed the same instructions to give the 
first diagnosis, but the final diagnosis was preceded by one of 4 different “types” of 
reflection, depending on the experimental condition to which they had been randomly 
allocated: return without instructions; identification of confirmatory evidence; identification 
of contradictory evidence; or identification of both confirmatory and contradictory evidence. 
Figure 1 presents the study design. 
Setting and participants 
All physicians registered for the 2018 Swiss board exam for general internal medicine in 
Bern, Switzerland, were considered eligible for the study. Senior residents and practicing 
physicians are allowed to take the licensing exam to be certified as specialists in internal 
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study, which would take place immediately after the exam. Those who accepted the invitation 
were recruited as participants, randomly allocated to 1 of the 4 experimental conditions, and 
tested after the exam.  
A priori power analysis, assuming to-be-detected effects of medium size (Cohen’s f = 0.25)35 
and the standard alpha level of .05, provided the estimation that a sample of 136 residents and 
practicing physicians would be sufficient to achieve a power of 0.80.  
We used a coding scheme to ensure that responses would be anonymous and could be linked 
to the scores obtained by the participants in the board exam. All participants provided written 
informed consent to participate in the study, including matching their responses to their exam 
score, and received $40.00 for their participation. The ethics committee of the Cantone Bern, 
Switzerland, deemed the study exempt from full ethical review (Req-2017-00967).  
Material and procedure 
The study used 8 written clinical cases. Each case consisted of a brief description of a 
patient’s history, complaints, symptoms, and findings from physical examination and tests. 
All cases had a confirmed diagnosis and had been used in previous studies with internal 
medicine residents.24–27 We chose cases to which a mean diagnostic accuracy score around 
0.3–0.4 (max 1) was observed in these previous studies. We aimed at difficult cases as they 
provide a basis for mistakes and repair by reflection to occur. The diagnoses of the cases 
were: small cell lung cancer, inflammatory bowel disease, bacterial pneumonia with sepsis, 
acute bacterial endocarditis, pseudomembranousus colitis, Vitamin B12 deficiency, celiac 
disease, and peripheral arterial occlusion disease. The cases were presented in a booklet, 1 
per page. To control for order effects, we prepared 2 versions of the booklets by alternating 
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For each case, we requested first that participants read the case and write down the most 
likely diagnosis for the case as quickly as possible but without jeopardizing accuracy. This 
instruction has been used to induce a more intuitive reasoning mode.24,25,30 To be clear, we 
understand that any diagnostic reasoning will always involve some degree of reflection, 
particularly with difficult cases. However, this instruction was intended to result in an initial 
processing as fast as possible to make review of the initial diagnosis meaningful. After that, 
the same case was presented again, and we requested that the participants follow different 
instructions, depending on the condition to which they had been assigned. In the return 
without instructions condition, they were presented the case again and requested to write 
down their final decision on the most likely diagnosis. In the confirmatory condition, we 
asked them to write down findings in the case that spoke in favor of the initial diagnosis, and 
the final most likely diagnosis. In the contradictory condition, they had to write down 
findings in the case that spoke against the initial diagnosis, and the final most likely 
diagnosis. Finally, in the confirmatory and contradictory condition, we asked that they write 
down findings in the case that spoke in favor of the initial diagnosis; findings in the case that 
spoke against the initial diagnosis, and the final most likely diagnosis for the case. The 
participants registered the time before and after each page by looking at a large digital clock 
visible in the room. So, in brief, for each case, participants read the case, provided an initial 
diagnosis, reflected upon it in a manner determined by the experimental condition, and then 
provided a final diagnosis. They then moved to the next case and repeated this procedure. An 
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Before diagnosing the cases, the participants provided information age, gender, and number 
of years in professional practice and, after completing the study, were asked “how often did 
you encounter the following diseases in the past?” followed by a list of the correct diagnoses 
for the 8 cases. Responses were collected on a 5-point Likert scale (from 1 = never to 5 = 
very frequently).  
The licensing exam itself consists of 120 single best answer multiple choice questions.  
Data analysis  
The accuracy of participants’ diagnoses was evaluated by considering the confirmed 
diagnosis of each case as a standard. Two board-certified internists (C.B., T.C.S.) blinded 
toward the experimental condition independently evaluated each diagnosis as correct, 
partially correct, or incorrect (scored as 1, 0.5, or 0 points, respectively). We considered a 
response correct when it mentioned the core diagnosis, and partially correct when the core 
was is not cited but a constituent element of the diagnosis was mentioned. The interrater 
agreement was high ICC(3,2) = 0.96), and disagreements were decided upon by a third rater 
(W.E.H.). 
To verify whether the 4 groups were similar in variables that could eventually influence the 
results, we performed separate analysis of variance (ANOVA) with experimental condition as 
between-subjects factors on age, number of years of clinical practice, experience with the 
diseases included in the study, and score obtained in the certification exam. We performed a 
repeated-measures ANOVA with experimental condition as between-subjects factor (return 
without instructions; confirmatory; contradictory; confirmatory and contradictory) and 
diagnostic phase (initial diagnosis; revised diagnosis) as within-subjects factor on the mean 
diagnostic accuracy scores. To examine the relationship between time to diagnosis and 
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the diagnostic process was not under the influence of our treatment. The data were analyzed 
using SPSS statistical software, version 25 for Mac (IBM Corp, Armonk, New York). 
Results 
One-hundred and sixty-seven physicians enrolled in the study and were randomized to 1 of 
the 4 groups. Table 1 presents the participants’ background information. The groups did not 
significantly differ in age F(3,162) = 0.28; P = .84, gender 2(6) = 7.23; P = .30, number 
of years of clinical practice F(3,161) = 0.49; P = .69, reported experience with the diseases 
included in the study F(3,162) = 0.45; Pp = .71, or the score obtained in the board 
certification exam F(3,152) = 2.25; P = .09.  
Table 2 presents the mean diagnostic accuracy scores for the initial diagnosis and the final 
diagnosis as a function of experimental condition. The mixed ANOVA showed a significant 
main effect of diagnosis phase, F(1,163) = 31.29; P < .001; p
2 = 0.16, with all groups 
showing higher diagnostic accuracy in the second phase (revised diagnosis) relative to the 
first phase (initial diagnosis). The main effect of the experimental condition under which the 
physicians performed was not significant F(3,163) = 1.19; P = .31; p
2 = 0.02, and there 
was no significant interaction effect F(3,163) = 1.80; P = .15; p
2 = 0.03.  
Time spent to diagnose the cases is presented in Table 3. There was a positive correlation 
between accuracy of the initial diagnosis and time spent to make this diagnosis, r = .23, P = 
.004.  
Discussion  
In this study, we investigated whether reflection upon initial diagnoses improved the 
diagnostic accuracy of a group of physicians and whether improvement was influenced by the 
type of confrontation with evidence from the case. The findings are in line with our 
hypothesis that reflection would increase diagnostic accuracy. Overall, accuracy scores 
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small. Contrary to our expectation, this increase did not depend on whether physicians were 
exposed to confrontation with evidence from the case. Simply returning to the case and 
having the chance to revise the initial diagnosis before making a final decision was enough to 
improve accuracy. Time to diagnose was associated with accuracy of initial diagnoses. 
These findings are in line with studies showing that reflection on initial diagnoses helps 
physicians repair errors and improves diagnostic performance.24–27 Other studies, however, 
have found no benefit of reflection to diagnostic performance.30–32 What could explain these 
discrepant findings? Evidence of the positive effect of reflection emerged from studies with 
difficult cases, but the diagnostic accuracy scores observed in some studies with negative 
results suggest that their cases were not straightforward either.30,31 Other factors besides 
differences in case difficulty might therefore explain why reflection led to improved accuracy 
in some studies but not in others. There may be a key conceptual and methodological 
difference that affects what can be gained from reflection. In this study, reflection is 
conceived as a deliberate consideration of initial judgments aimed at verifying its grounds. 
This conceptualization is shared by studies that found reflection to improve initial 
diagnosis.36 Conversely, studies that found no advantage of reflection to diagnostic 
performance encouraged physicians to reflect throughout the whole diagnostic process, 
including both the generation of diagnostic hypotheses and their verification. The primary 
mechanism through which reflection helps is by leading physicians to recognize relevant case 
findings that were initially overlooked or misinterpreted, which seems a main source of 
diagnostic error among experienced physicians.37,38 This is why reflection only helped when 
there was enough knowledge to recognize actually relevant features while revising the case.25 
It also explains why reflection improved on initial diagnoses when physicians were allowed 
to review the case features but was not beneficial when physicians could not go back to the 
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reflection to act because it triggers a search for possible mistakes, with a more critical check 
of the grounds of initial judgments that is not present (or not so much) when physicians are 
simply asked to be careful from the start. One can expect a request to review to induce such 
scrutinization of initial hypotheses even when participants spend more time to give the initial 
diagnosis than to reflect upon it, as it happened in our study (possibly because the highly 
difficult cases demanded time to make sense of and integrate all the information).  
Regarding the type of reflection, confronting physicians with evidence from the case during 
reflection did not make it more beneficial. Even when physicians received no instruction on 
what to search for, returning to the case increased accuracy. The effect of reflection was 
small, with a gain of 22% in accuracy. In other studies with similar participants, diagnostic 
accuracy improved 40% or even more after physicians deliberately reflected upon their initial 
diagnosis for complex cases.24,25 In these previous studies, participants were not only 
requested to search for both confirmatory and contradictory evidence, but they were also 
required to generate alternative diagnoses and submit them to a similar analysis before 
making a final diagnostic decision. In the current study, participants were not asked to 
consider alternatives and, though they may have eventually done so, they certainly did not 
engage in scrutinizing the grounds for each of these alternative diagnoses. The amount of 
reflection triggered by the confrontation with the case evidence in the present study is 
therefore much less extensive than in previous studies, therefore reducing its potential to 
restructure initial reasoning. Indeed, while deliberate reflection upon a case took 5–7 minutes 
in those studies,24,25 our participants invested around 2 minutes in reflection. This may 
explain why confrontation with evidence as operationalized in this study did not lead to more 
substantial improvement than simply revising the case. It may also be the reason why gains 
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To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to empirically investigate the effect the 
type of reflection has on diagnostic accuracy. Our findings add to what we know about it and 
show issues requiring further investigation. Future research should explore whether an 
approach that makes the confrontation with case evidence more “reflection-triggering,” for 
example, by requesting physicians to generate alternative diagnoses, would increase the 
potential of reflection to improve diagnostic accuracy. While the deliberate reflection 
procedure used in several studies has proven very powerful to repair diagnostic errors, it is 
too time consuming and effortful to be applicable in real settings. In our study, taking a 
second look at an initial diagnosis required physicians around 2 minutes, and this short time 
was sufficient to allow for initial mistakes to be corrected. The increase in accuracy was 
small, but our findings suggest that suspending a decision, returning to the case, and revising 
an initial diagnosis is worthwhile, at least when cases are difficult. Returning to reflect is 
likely to be feasible in most situations in clinical practice. Whether it is possible to increase 
the potential benefit of this approach by triggering more reflection while keeping it within the 
boundaries of what is feasible in practice requires further investigation.  
This study has limitations. First, our participants had on average around 5 years of clinical 
practice, and it is not clear whether the findings would apply to more experienced physicians. 
Because difficulties in restructuring initial diagnostic reasoning seem to increase with 
experience,39 it may be that more experienced physicians would benefit more from a more 
extensive approach to reflection. This idea requires further investigation. Second, the study 
was conducted immediately after a high-stakes exam that may have tired participants, 
potentially hindering their performance both while giving an initial diagnosis and during 
reflection. However, the thoroughness of the participants’ responses indicate how seriously 
the physicians took their task. Finally, we used written clinical cases, which do not provide 
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findings generalize to actual practice is to be determined. Nevertheless, empirical research 
has shown that written cases allow for reliably detecting group-level differences and are a 
good proxy for the investigation of physicians’ performance in real settings.40,41  
Summing up, this study has found that returning to the case to reflect upon initial diagnoses 
increased diagnostic accuracy on difficult clinical cases, reinforcing the value of further 
reflection to reduce diagnostic errors. The improvement in accuracy was small and not 
dependent on what physicians were required to search for during reflection. Future research 
should investigate whether revising the case can be made more beneficial by triggering 
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Diagram of the study design and participants flow for 167 physicians enrolled for the Swiss 
internal medicine certification exam, from a study of reflection on initial diagnoses and final 












Characteristics of 167 Physician Participants Enrolled for the the Swiss Internal Medicine Certification Exam, From a Study 




instruction Confirmatory Contradictory 
Confirmatory and 
contradictory Total 
Age, mean (95% CI) 31.34 (30.09, 32.59) 31.24 (29.71, 32.77) 31.73 (30.62, 32.85) 30.87 (29.53, 32.21) 31.30 (30.66, 31.94) 
Female, no. (%) 20 (44.4) 28 (66.7) 20 (48.8) 20 (51.3) 88 (52.7) 
Number of years in 
clinical practice, mean 
(95% CI) 
5.29 (4.36, 6.23) 5.07 (4.23, 5.91) 5.73 (4.66, 6.80) 4.95 (3.87, 6.02) 5.27 (3.4.79, 5.74) 
Experience with the 
diseases (range 1–5), 
mean (95% CI) 
2.78 (2.60, 2.97) 2.70 (2.55, 2.86) 2.70 (2.56, 2.86) 2.81 (2.64, 2.98) 2.75 (2.67, 2.83) 
Exam score, mean 
(95% CI) 
90.10 (86.70, 93.49) 91.29 (88.61, 93.97) 86.21 (82.45, 89.97) 91.75 (88.19, 95.31) 89.85 (88.19, 91.50) 
Abbreviation: CI, confidence interval. 
aAll participants were recruited from the pool of physicians registered for the Swiss board exam for general internal medicine were 
considered eligible for the study. Senior residents and practicing physicians are allowed to take the licensing exam to be certified as 











Mean Diagnostic Accuracy Scores Obtained by 167 Physician Participants at the First and Second Diagnostic Phases, From a 




instruction Confirmatory Contradictory 
Confirmatory and 
contradictory Overall  
Initial diagnosis, 
mean (95% CI) 
0.21 (0.17, 0.26) 0.24 (0.19, 0.29) 0.22 (0.17, 0.26) 0.19 (0.15, 0.23) 0.22 (0.19, 0.24)  
Final diagnosis, 
mean (95% CI) 
0.23 (0.18, 0.28) 0.31 (0.25, 0.37) 0.26 (0.22, 0.30) 0.25 (0.20, 0.31) 0.26 (0.24, 0.29) 
Abbreviation: CI, confidence interval. 
aRange of accuracy scores was 0–1, where 0 = incorrect and 1 = correct. All participants were recruited from the pool of physicians 
registered for the Swiss board exam for general internal medicine. Senior residents and practicing physicians are allowed to take the 












Mean Time Spent by 167 Physician Participants in Diagnosis (Seconds) at the First and Second Diagnostic Phases, From a 




instruction Confirmatory Contradictory 
Confirmatory and 
contradictory Overall  
Initial diagnosis, 
mean (95% CI) 
140.05 (123.85, 156.24) 151.76 (137.35, 166.17) 155.91 (138.21, 173.61) 129.17 (114.92, 143.43) 144.59 (136.81, 152.37)  
Final diagnosis, 
mean (95% CI) 
79.00 (65.70, 92.29) 108.05 (93.95, 122.15) 116.57 (101.46, 131.68) 129.37 (108.05, 150.69) 107.57 (99.31, 115.84) 
Abbreviation: CI, confidence interval. 
aAll participants were recruited from the pool of physicians registered for the Swiss board exam for general internal medicine. Senior residents 














































301 did not accept 
the invitation 
174 enrolled in the 
study 




43 randomized to 
contradictory 
evidence 
42 randomized to 
confirmatory 
evidence 
45 randomized to 
return without 
instructions 
45 included in the 
primary analysis 
39 included in the 
primary analysis 
41 included in the 
primary analysis 
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